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Abstrak
Sikap tegas yang diambil oleh Pemerintahan Presiden Joko Widodo dalam memerangi Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing telah 
menarik perhatian yang luas dari akademisi. Namun demikian, riset yang ada cenderung fokus untuk menganalisis penegakan hukum dalam 
bentuk kebijakan penenggalaman kapal. Konsekuensinya, studi yang ada tidak mampu memahami bagaimana di saat yang bersamaan Indonesia 
mengatasi persoalan tersebut dengan mengkriminalisasi IUU Fishing di level global. Tulisan ini bertujuan menutup celah tersebut. Memanfaatkan 
lima tahapan dalam evolusi historis pembentukan rezim pelarangan global yang diperkenalkan oleh Andreas dan Nadelmann (2006), tulisan ini 
mengivestigasi perkembangan kampanye yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia untuk mengkriminalisasi IUU Fishing dan mengidentifikasi sejumlah 
hambatan yang dihadapi oleh Indonesia dalam mendorong kemajuan kampanye kriminalisasi tersebut. Tulisan ini menemukan bahwa Indonesia 
tengah berada di tahapan ketiga pembentukan rezim pelarangan global terhadap kejahatan transnasional terorganisir di industri perikanan dan 
harus menghadapi hambatan berupa lemahnya argumentasi dan ketidaksepakatan sejumlah negara.
Kata kunci: kriminalisasi, IUU Fishing, kejahatan transnasional terorganisir, kejahatan perikanan transnasional terorganisir.
Abstract
The staunch measures taken by President Joko Widodo’s administration in combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing has 
attracted considerable attention from academia. However, previous studies focused on analyzing law enforcement measures in terms of the 
sinking-vessel policy. Consequently, they failed to adequately comprehend how Indonesia deals with the problem by criminalizing IUU Fishing 
at the global level. This article attempts to fill such a gap. Employing the five stages of the historical evolution of a global prohibition regime, 
introduced by Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), this research investigated the progress of Indonesia’s campaign to criminalize IUU Fishing at 
the global level and identified some hurdles that Indonesia has to address in fostering the advancement of the criminalization campaign. This 
article discovered that Indonesia has arrived at the third stage of making the global prohibition regime of transnational organized crime in the 
fisheries industry and has to deal with the hurdles of argumentation weakness and disagreement from several countries.
Keywords: criminalization, IUU Fishing, transnational organized crime, transnational organized fisheries crime.
INTRODUCTION
    Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the 
world with valuable fisheries assets. This country is not 
only endowed with one of the highest marine biodiversity 
but also one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the 
world (Conway, 2018). Unfortunately, Indonesia has not 
been able to protect and manage its fisheries sector in an 
effective manner. The decades of the rampant practices 
of IUU Fishing committed by foreign fishing vessels have 
made the country unable to attain the maximum 
economic potential of its fisheries industry. The Ministry 
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) estimated that 
the IUU Fishing in Indonesian water has caused between 
USD 3 and 20 billion losses per year (Conway, 2018). 
Notwithstanding the sheer scale of its economic loss and 
socio-ecological impacts, the government has never taken 
adequate measures to curb IUU Fishing in its ocean 
(Sutinen, 2013). 
   After President Joko Widodo came to power, 
Indonesia has increased its attempt to combat IUU 
Fishing. During his first tenure, President Widodo 
attempted to embrace the sea and turn Indonesia into a 
global maritime fulcrum (Connelly, 2015; Sukma, 2014). 
Concerning the fisheries industry, this grand vision is 
strengthened by putting the sector as one of the priorities 
in Indonesia’s short-term development agenda 
(Bappenas, 2015). Furthermore, President Widodo 
manifests its vision through the increase in institutional 
support by establishing the Coordinating Ministry of 
Maritime and Investment Affairs (CMMIA) and 
doubling the budget of MMAF (Scarpello, 2020). In 
addition, President Widodo’s commitment to reform 
Indonesia’s fisheries sector was evident in his 
appointment of Susi Pudjiastuti as the Minister of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries. With her experience as a 
seafood businesswoman who suffered a loss due to illegal 
fishing, Susi had intensified the law enforcement 
measure by sinking hundreds of foreign fishing vessels 
committed to IUU Fishing in Indonesia’s waters. This 
article seeks to understand Indonesia’s policy to combat 
IUU Fishing under President Jokowi’s administration. In 
particular, this article pays attention to the increase in 
Indonesia’s engagement with the international 
government network to criminalize IUU Fishing by 
garnering support to categorize IUU Fishing as 
Transnational Organized Crimes (TOC).
      Indonesia’s tough stance to combat IUU Fishing has 
attracted considerable interest from academia. They 
investigated the national and international legal 
framework according to the government’s effort to 
enforce its law to combat the practice (Kristiyanto, 2015; 
Busro, 2017). In this regard, (Liliansa, 2020b) examined 
that the sinking and burning of foreign fishing vessels 
committed to IUU Fishing were necessary under the 
UNCLOS framework, and she suggested a market-based 
approach to combat IUU Fishing (Liliansa, 2020a). 
Liliansa’s (2020a) research shows that Indonesia’s 
external engagement with other countries is the key to 
effectively eradicating IUU Fishing, which lacks attention 
from the observers of Susi’s unconventional policy. 
Despite this little attention, Taufik (2017) and Chapsos 
& Hamilton (2018) have raised concern about Susi’s 
campaign to categorize IUU Fishing as TOC to the 
international society. However, these researchers have 
paid no attention to figure out the progress of the 
campaign. This article fills such gaps.
      The problems analyzed in this article are twofold. First, 
this research attempts to locate the progress of Indonesia’s 
external engagement with the international government 
network to criminalize IUU Fishing as TOC. Second, this 
research tries to identify some hurdles that Indonesia has 
to face during the criminalization campaign.
     To answer the research problems, this article employed 
Andreas and Nadelmann’s (2006) five stages of the 
historical evolution of a global prohibition regime. This 
article revealed that Indonesia has arrived at the third 
stage of making the global prohibition regime of TOC in 
the fisheries industry. In this stage, Indonesia has been 
highly active in various international forums to convince 
international society to criminalize IUU Fishing. Pushing 
forward the criminalization to the highest level of the 
global prohibition regime would be an arduous process. 
That said, Indonesia has to strengthen its criminalization 
arguments and develop various strategies to make the 
opposing countries support the criminalization of IUU 
Fishing. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
  This section identifies several studies discussing 
Indonesia’s effort in combating IUU Fishing. In general, 
the topic has become a subject of inquiry from two 
disciplines in social science, including law and 
International Relations (IR). Insofar, analysis on the 
MMAF-led sinking-vessel policy has attracted considerable 
interest from legal and IR scholars. Focusing investigation 
on that domestic law enforcement measure, indeed, is 
only half of the story. Contrary to the research on 
domestic law enforcement, there has been little discussion 
about how Indonesia deals with IUU Fishing at the 
regional and international levels. While some scholars 
have embarked on such an analysis, their analysis 
frameworks are insufficient to comprehend how 
Indonesia tries to control IUU Fishing through 
criminalization at the regional and international level.
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    Legal analysis on Indonesia’s stringent measures to 
curb IUU Fishing put primary concern on finding the 
justification of burning and sinking vessels caught fishing 
in Indonesia’s waters without possessing a license by 
referring to the domestic and international law. Despite 
all questions on the legality of such measures, some 
scholars remind that article 69 (4) of Law No. 45/2009 on 
Fisheries provides a legal basis for the policy to burn and 
sink illegal fishing vessels (Ikrami, 2017). Every sinking of 
illegal fishing vessels by Indonesia’s authority is justifiable 
because it fulfills some steps and conditions mandated by 
the law (Busro, 2017). In addition, such stringent measures 
are not in contravention of international law since 
UNCLOS, the most comprehensive convention governing 
the sea, paves the way for every state party to take necessary 
action in ensuring legal compliance within their EEZ 
(Liliansa, 2020b). Be that as it may, some researchers also 
raised concern on the possibility of contradiction between 
the stern measure and international law. Since the 
UNCLOS has not incorporated burning and sinking the 
vessels as a law enforcement measure in EEZ (Rustam, 
2014), how Indonesia’s inform the flag states regarding the 
detain of their Fishing masters and crews may contravene 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1993 
(Busro, 2017).
    International Relations analysis has emphasized the 
reasons behind the sinking and burning of illegal fishing 
vessels. In this regard, domestic politics dynamics provide 
an avenue for the more assertive approach in Indonesia’s 
external relations. The uncommon measure can be 
comprehended as coercive diplomacy (Rijal, 2019) to 
carry out the global maritime fulcrum vision of the 
president. The coercive measure to sink the illegal fishing 
vessels, affecting many neighboring countries, can also be 
comprehended as an effort to reassert the state’s 
authority (Connelly, 2015) and satisfy the increasing 
nationalist sentiment among Indonesians (McRae, 
2019). This rising nationalism in Indonesia is regarded as 
a determining factor of the enormous support from the 
people for such policy.  Isnurhadi (2018) went one step 
further by investigating how the government garnered 
popular support in sinking the illegal fishing vessels 
through the lens of securitization. The framing of the 
problem from a security angle, in turn, enables the 
employment of an extraordinary action to combat IUU 
Fishing.
      In this respect, it is essential to bear in mind that the 
studies mentioned above do not consider the increase in 
Indonesia’s government engagement with the 
international government network to curb IUU Fishing 
at the regional and global levels. Such analyses have 
overlooked how the Minister of Marine and Fisheries 
Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Coordinating 
Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs using 
several international forums such as regular session of 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(CCPCJ), UN Ocean Conference, or ASEAN Regional 
Forum to garner international support and foster 
collective actions in combating IUU Fishing. The sinking 
of the vessel’s policy may shed light on the assertive turn 
of Indonesia’s government to combat IUU Fishing. 
However, such a deterrent measure would not be able to 
address the root cause of the problem. Indonesia’s 
government realizes that IUU Fishing would only be 
eradicated if there is a concerted effort at the global level 
to take a new yet more stringent approach in dealing with 
the problem (Busro, 2019). Analysis of Indonesia’s 
international campaign has become more critical. It is 
why research conducted by Taufik (2017) gives a clue to 
understand the bigger picture of Indonesia’s effort in 
combating IUU Fishing. In his investigation on the 
rationale behind Indonesia’s government campaign to 
categorize IUU Fishing as a Transnational Organized 
Crime (TOC), Taufik argued that the government has 
tried to seek a better result in eradicating IUU Fishing. 
Recognition of IUU Fishing as a TOC will increase the 
commitment of foreign countries to take a concrete step 
in fighting IUU Fishing and creating a more intensive 
international cooperation to deal with the pressing issue. 
In this regard, Chapsos and Hamilton (2018) and 
Hendarto (2018) justified Indonesia’s campaign by 
developing the link between TOC and IUU Fishing in 
the case of Benjina.
     Despite its contribution to open a further discussion 
on Indonesia’s campaign to categorize IUU Fishing as a 
part of the TOC, such an analysis failed to discuss the 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
     Having identified the paucity of previous research to 
comprehend Indonesia’s fight against IUU Fishing at the 
international level, it was decided that the best approach 
to understand the campaign to categorize IUU Fishing as 
TOC is through the combination of International 
Relations and criminology. Notwithstanding the increasing 
trans-governmental relations and international cooperation 
to control TOC, scant attention has been devoted to study 
the International Relations-criminology nexus (Loader & 
Percy, 2012). By being attentive to cross-border 
criminalization and crime control phenomena, Andreas & 
Nadelmann (2006) introduced a bridge between both 
disciplines that enable more detailed analysis on how states 
criminalize particular transnational activities.
    In this paper, criminalization refers to a historical 
process in which certain activities and behaviors are 
justified and treated as criminal under the law (Farmer, 
2016; McLaughlin & Muncie, 2001). The creation of this 
new criminal activity is prevalent within the jurisdiction 
of a state and takes place across national borders. Given 
the growing attention of governments across the globe to 
a range of suspicious transnational activities, there has 
been an increase in the intensity of internationalization of 
crime control (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). Using 
trans-governmental work and international organizations, 
some states try to convince others to criminalize such 
transnational activities.
  Cooperation between states does not stop at 
criminalizing particular transnational activities. 
According to Andreas and Nadelmann (2006), several 
countries also work together to promote deeper and 
broader criminal justice control in identifying, 
dissuading, and prohibiting transnational crimes. To 
implement this international crime control, the task of 
institutions dealing with domestic crime control on a 
day-to-day basis, such as police, prosecutors, and courts, is 
extended. A set of rules and mechanisms are created to 
dictate their action and accommodate international law 
enforcement. Andreas and Nadelmann (2006: 255) 
suggested that such mechanisms may include 
‘extradition, bilateral and multilateral law enforcement 
treaties, international conventions, the criminal justice 
agencies of international organizations such as the 
United Nations and the international police organization 
(Interpol)’. Furthermore, several cooperatives to enforce 
the law carried out by regional and political networks also 
share the burden of making international crime control 
works.
complexity of Indonesia’s strategy to garner international 
support in combating IUU Fishing. Another weakness in 
the previous studies is the failure to track the campaign’s 
progress. Most of the studies regarding Indonesia and IUU 
Fishing have not attempted to comprehend what Indonesia 
has achieved and what obstacles Indonesia has to face in 
categorizing IUU Fishing as a TOC. This weakness is 
prevalent because of the limitations of the theoretical 
framework which the previous studies employed. Using a 
multidisciplinary approach by combining International 
Relations and legal analyses may shed new light on this 
endeavor. Concerning the complex and cross-border 
nature of IUU Fishing, Indonesia has been active in 
establishing bilateral and multilateral cooperation to frame 
the problem using the TOC lens (Busro, 2019).
       Notwithstanding the enormous diplomatic effort that 
Indonesia took during the first period of President 
Jokowi’s administration until today, international society 
has not reached a conclusion that IUU Fishing should be 
seen as a TOC problem. Even though some studies have 
emphasized the nexus between IUU Fishing and TOC, 
Indonesia’s argumentation to frame IUU Fishing as 
TOC suffers many flaws to be accepted by international 
society (Stølsvik, 2019). Having realized the difficulty, the 
government has shifted its approach to the effort in 
regulating fisheries crime at the regional level (Rini, 
2020). While the study on the government’s effort to 
establish regional cooperation in combating crime related 
to fisheries may give us an optimistic view of the 
campaign’s progress (Rini, 2020), the legal approach 
failed to locate the current stage of Indonesia’s campaign. 
In addition, the lack of conceptual tools of the approach 
led the research to downplay some political aspects that 
might hinder the success of the campaign. Consequently, 
it failed to explain the limited progress of the campaign 
even after such a long effort and lame light that it had.
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  The international relations-criminology nexus 
introduced by Andreas and Nadelmann helps this 
research track Indonesia’s campaign to criminalize IUU 
Fishing. For Andreas and Nadelmann, a successful 
attempt at criminalizing particular transnational activities 
will result in an international prohibition regime. The 
international prohibition regime is a favorable 
mechanism considering how current law enforcement 
measures at the unilateral and bilateral level lack 
effectiveness to deal with cross-border criminalized 
activities. Andreas and Nadelmann elaborated that the 
process of making international prohibition regimes 
consists of five stages. In the first stage, a transnational 
activity is not criminalized yet. It is still perceived as a 
legitimate activity that has state support to back its 
operation. However, in the second stage, the perception 
toward such activity witnesses change. Concerning states 
begin to redefine transnational activity as a problem and 
crime.
     As a consequence, such transnational activity has to 
lose its legitimacy gradually. It is important to note that 
some states still turn a blind eye or even support such 
activity. In the third stage, proponents of the prohibition 
regime take a more active stance to convince 
international society so that the activity can be treated as 
a criminal. A global convention is the aim of the 
concerned states since it ensures the criminalized 
transnational activity status and entails a mechanism of 
law enforcement in international law structure. In the 
subsequent stage, the proponents of the regime rely on 
criminal laws and policing action to regulate the activity 
at the global level. In addition, international institutions 
and conventions coordinate the regulation. The fifth 
stage happens when the suppression of criminalized 
activity is successful, as indicated by the very low 
prevalence of the criminalized activities across the globe.
    While the historical evolution of the international 
prohibition regime is useful to examine whether the 
criminalization is progressing or not, Andreas and 
Nadelmann also raised concern on several factors that 
might foster or hinder the making of such regime. By 
employing an analytically eclectic approach, both scholars 
combine three theoretical perspectives in IR (liberalism, 
realism, and constructivism) to make sense of the 
internationalization of crime control. The combination 
of three perspectives has shed light on the complex links 
between interests, power, and norms that influence the 
dynamics of effort to establish an international 
prohibition regime. Liberalism helps us understand that 
the proliferation of international police cooperation 
fostered by interdependency between states has led to 
common interests in responding to the growing 
transnational activities. On the other hand, realism, 
emphasizing the primacy of power politics, sheds light on 
how powerful states shape the design of the regime. 
Constructivism is then useful to understand the 
redefinition of particular transnational activities as a 
crime by transnational moral entrepreneurs and how it 
evolved into a prohibition norm.
RESEARCH METHOD
    This study is qualitative research with a case study 
method. According to Ragin (in Della Porta and Keating, 
2008), the case study method is useful to scrutinize the 
formation of a case. The scrutiny can be done by doing a 
comprehensive empirical study on one or a limited 
number of phenomena. The case study method was 
chosen as it enabled this study to investigate the progress 
and the hurdles of Indonesia’s campaign to criminalize 
IUU Fishing at the global level.
     In collecting the data, this study used desk research 
and in-depth interview. Besides journal articles and 
books, the desk research data covered reports and official 
documents from government agencies, international 
organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). For instance, this research utilized the annual 
press briefing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan 
and Jakarta Concord. In addition, this study also 
analyzed data from various IOs, such as the report of the 
UN Ocean Conference and UNODC’s official 
publication. Furthermore, this study also used reports 
from NGOs such as California Environmental Initiatives 
and Ocean Development Initiatives. Last but not least, 
this study also employed online news to collect 
statements from the government of Indonesia, foreign 
JURNAL HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
VOL. 9, NO. 2 (2020): October 2020-March 2021 170
countries, and international organizations track the 
progress of Indonesia’s campaign.
       Realizing that some crucial data regarding Indonesia’s 
campaign strategy were not covered in the literature, this 
study applied the in-depth interview to complete the 
needed information. The in-depth interview, conducted 
from August to September 2020, targeted public servants 
and NGO activists involved in the criminalization 
campaign. Interviewees comprised one former leading 
figure of Presidential Task Force to Combat IUU 
Fishing, one Indonesian Ambassador to a European 
country who was in charge of the campaign, two public 
servants from CMMIA, and one activist from Indonesia 
Ocean Justice Initiative.
      The enormity of the fight against IUU Fishing during 
the first tenure of President Widodo has to be understood 
as a response toward political economy symptoms that he 
had to deal with. As the current account deficit had 
mounted because of the end of the global commodity 
boom, Indonesia had to find a new source of export. As 
the largest archipelagic country in the world and the 
second-largest producer of seafood after China, Indonesia 
has the potential to increase its revenue from the wild 
fisheries capture industry. However, illegal fishing 
committed primarily by foreign fishing vessels and 
unsustainable fishing conducted by domestic vessels led to 
the country’s inability to reach the economic potential of 
its fisheries industry (KKP 2015). IUU Fishing has been 
estimated to cost between USD 3 and 20 billion each year 
in Indonesia (Conway 2018). Moreover, the Minister of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, said that 
Indonesia lost about IDR 209.1 billion of tax revenue 
from 187 taxpayers in the fisheries industry in 2016 
(Tempo, 2016). The decade of intensive IUU Fishing in 
Indonesian waters has led to a sharp decline in the number 
of the fisheries household of this largest archipelagic 
nation in the world. While in 2003, the fisheries 
household in Indonesia reached 1.6 million households, 
in 2013, the number of the fisheries household declined 
almost half of it to only 800 thousand (Hamdani, 2018).
      Thus, to ensure the prosperity of its society from the 
fisheries sector, Indonesia had to curb IUU Fishing 
whatever it takes. It came as no surprise, then, that 
fulfillment of the sovereignty pillar was the policy priority 
of MMAF under the leadership of Minister Susi. The 
fulfillment of this sovereignty pillar has been done by 
invoking Article 69 section (4) in Indonesia’s Fisheries 
Law. This article has enabled the government to burn or 
sink fishing vessels committed to IUU Fishing in 
Indonesia’s waters. The law enforcement measures have 
been considered extraordinary measures by many 
observers because of their massive scale and media 
exposure (Taufika, 2020). It seems that the burning and 
sinking vessels policy has led to a significant decline in 
the practices of IUU Fishing in Indonesian waters 
(Tempo, 2017). As MMAF had succeeded in reducing 
the number of IUU Fishing in Indonesia’s sea, it paved 
the way for sustainable marine and fisheries resources 
and a prosperous fisheries industry in Indonesia.
   Although Indonesia’s Fisheries Law provides an 
opportunity for the government to take a staunch 
measure to deter future perpetrators of IUU Fishing, 
relying only on unilateral measures will not make 
Indonesia tackle the root causes of the problem. After 
finishing the analysis and evaluation of ex-foreign fishing 
vessels that operated in Indonesia’s waters, Susi and her 
team concluded that IUU Fishing practices in Indonesia 
contained the element of TOC (Interview, October 
2020). These foreign fishing vessels were operated by 
foreign companies establishing front companies and 
fabricating the handover of document of ownership; 
performing double-flagging and double-registering of 
vessels; manipulating the report to avoid monitoring and 
taxes; using local names to take the benefit from 
Indonesia’s fuel subsidy and smuggle it; sailing without 
port and seaworthiness clearance; deactivating Vessel 
Monitoring Systems and Automatic Identification 
Systems; employing foreign captains and crews against 
Indonesian laws; using illegal fishing gears; transshipment 
at sea; and fabricating fishing authorization and encroach 
in waters reserved for local, small-scale fisher (Scarpello 
2020). In light of the evidence, Pudjiastuti (2020) realized 
that the only way to eliminate IUU Fishing was by 
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redefining the problem as a TOC and ensuring that 
other countries comprehend the problem from a similar 
perspective to take global collective action against it.
    Indonesia’s effort to criminalize IUU Fishing has a 
grounding in the academic discourse. In this regard, 
several publications identified the nexus between IUU 
Fishing and TOC. Chapsos and Hamilton (2018) argued 
that IUU Fishing enables perfect transnational organized 
crime conditions in the fisheries sector to thrive. In this 
regard, organized crime groups with a long experience 
conducting their transnational criminal activities 
perceived that IUU Fishing could cover their illicit 
business (Liddick, 2014). It came as no surprise that 
several researchers found that a range of transnational 
organized crimes like corruption, tax crime, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, and smuggling (including 
migrant, fuel, weapons, and endangered species) was 
prevalent in IUU Fishing (De Coning, 2011; Percy, 
2016).
     The criminalization of IUU Fishing is considered a 
way to achieve a more effective result in the fight against 
IUU Fishing. It is important to note that the perpetrators 
share a common perception that IUU Fishing is a 
low-risk activity (Lindley et al., 2019). The possibility of 
such perception to prevail is related to the effectiveness 
of current measures in dealing with it. Rather than seeing 
the criminal lens problem, current measures perceive 
IUU Fishing as a fisheries management problem (Lindley 
et al., 2019; Telesetsky 2014; UN Ocean Conference 
2020). As a consequence, the problem of transnational 
organized crimes is prolonged without enough 
punishment.
    Furthermore, the absence of governance capable of 
dealing with fisheries, including transnational organized 
crimes, comprehensively aggravates the situation (Lindley 
et al., 2019). Former Deputy of Maritime Sovereignty of 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs, 
Arif Havas Oegroseno (2019), once said that “The FAO 
will likely say that crimes are not within its mandate and 
the UNODC may argue that fisheries are not their 
responsibilities. Interpol can liaise, but it is not an 
international organization with a mandate to create 
global norms to be implemented globally.”  Thus, the 
stakeholders in transnational organized fisheries crimes, 
such as port states, coastal states, and flag states and 
fisheries, must establish an international law instrument 
that can deter and reduce fisheries crimes (UN Ocean 
Conference, 2020).
       The finding of the Benjina case has opened a window 
of opportunity for Indonesia to push the agenda of 
international crime control on IUU Fishing. The 
widespread attention from international media and 
academia has generated a sense of the severity of the IUU 
Fishing problem. The Benjina case has demonstrated 
how IUU Fishing might contain the traditional TOC 
prohibited by the international society for a long time. In 
the Benjina case, the migrant Fishing crews from several 
Southeast Asian countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, 
and Laos had to deal with human rights abuse after 
entering the fisheries industry. Working for Pusaka 
Benjina Resources, these migrant fishermen testified to 
Indonesian court that they witnessed the torture and 
working restlessly, sometimes up to 24 hours, without 
receiving any payment (The Guardian 2016). They added 
that the company incarcerated these fishermen in cells. 
In a report to Associated Press, McDowell, Mason, and 
Mendoza (2015), it was claimed that what happened in 
Benjina was slavery. This perception, then, created a 
sense of urgency among Indonesia’s policymakers to 
foster the criminalization of IUU Fishing.
    Indonesia has started the international campaign to 
criminalize IUU Fishing long before Joko Widodo 
became the President of Indonesia. Having succeeded in 
fostering UN ECOSOC to officially recognize illegal 
logging as one of the transnational organized crimes, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the 
leadership of Hassan Wirajuda, has embarked on a series 
of a diplomatic effort to make the UN issued a resolution 
recognizing IUU Fishing as a new emerging form of 
transnational crime (Wirajuda, 2009). In the fourth 
session of the conference of the parties to the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (UNTOC COP), the Head of Indonesia’s 
Indonesia’s Campaign to Criminalize IUU Fishing: 
Progress and Hurdles
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delegation, H.E. Triyono Wibowo, raised concern on the 
nexus between IUU Fishing and TOC. Based on articles 
2 and 3 in the convention, Triyono claimed that criminal 
activities found in IUU Fishing are in accordance with 
the criteria of transnational organized crimes (UNTOC, 
2008). With that being said, Triyono and Indonesia’s 
delegation tried to redefine the IUU Fishing and 
convince the conference to criminalize such practice.
   Even though it had kicked off the campaign, the 
criminalization of IUU Fishing had never become a 
priority of the diplomatic establishment under 
Yudhoyono’s administration. During his presidency, 
Yudhoyono focused on middle power diplomacy to 
restore Indonesia’s reputation and stand on the world 
stage by building a bridge between the western and 
Islamic world  (Alvian et al., 2017; Fitriani 2015).
    After Jokowi came to power in 2014, there was a 
significant shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. 
Considered as an inward-looking president by numerous 
commentators (David and Harris-Rimmer, 2016; 
Harding and Mechant, 2016; Qin, 2015), Jokowi did not 
withdraw Indonesia from its active role in various 
multilateral forums. Alvian et al. (2017) suggested that 
Jokowi’s administration shows a different foreign 
relations approach by adopting a meta-power strategy 
while leaving Yudhoyono’s relational power strategy 
behind.  Jokowi may be regarded as a leader who retreats 
Indonesia’s leadership in several multilateral forums 
such as ASEAN and the UN (Purba, 2019; Qin, 2015). 
However, under the Global Maritime Fulcrum vision 
banner, President Jokowi increased Indonesia’s effort at 
the global level to promote alternative normality in 
combating IUU Fishing (Alvian et al., 2017). Indonesia’s 
effort to establish a global prohibition regime on IUU 
Fishing, then, can be seen as a translation of this strategy.
     Indonesia’s campaign to criminalize IUU FISHING 
during Jokowi’s first term in office was quite intensive. 
While under Yudhoyono’s presidency, the role in 
criminalizing IUU Fishing was dominated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Jokowi’s administration, 
other institutions such as the Ministry of Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries as well as Coordinating Ministry on 
Maritime and Investment Affairs (CMMIA) have joined 
the fray (Interview, September 2020a; Interview, 
September 2020b; Interview, October 2020). Each 
institution involved in the campaign has the 
responsibility to redefine the IUU Fishing problem as 
TOC and follow up the redefinition by an international 
legal mechanism to institutionalize the criminalization. 
The combination of these three institutions has led to a 
more varied approach in achieving the targets mentioned 
above. On the one hand, the MMAF emphasized 
bilateral and international engagement to garner 
criminalization support (Interview, October 2020). On 
the other hand, the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime 
and Investment Affairs focused its engagement at the 
regional level (Interview, September 2020a; Interview, 
September 2020b). While both ministries implemented 
a different strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs always 
assisted in the effort of both institutions.
    At the bilateral level, Norway has been the strategic 
partner of Indonesia to criminalize IUU Fishing. Letter 
of Intent on Marine Affairs and Fisheries Cooperation of 
the Indonesia Ministry of Marine Affairs and the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries of the 
Kingdom of Norway signed in 2015 laid the foundation 
for such cooperation.  In this Letter of Intent, Indonesia 
and Norway declared their commitment to work hand in 
hand by supporting each other in their effort to combat 
the transnational organized fisheries crime (TOFC) in 
international forums. The Letter of Intent was followed 
up by conducting several join events to raise awareness 
and understanding about the seriousness of TOFC, the 
High-Level Side Event of Transnational Organized 
Fisheries Crime (TOFC) in the 25th session of the 
CCPCJ in 2016 (Asydhad, 2016a). In addition, both 
countries have shown continuing support to the 
International Symposium on Fisheries Crimes.
    At the international level, Indonesia has used some 
multi-stakeholder forums and the UN System to 
criminalize IUU Fishing. Indonesia utilized the 
opportunity in multi-stakeholder forums, which involved 
the participation of state and non-state actors such as the 
International Symposium on Fisheries Crime and Our 
Ocean Conference to redefine the problem of IUU 
Fishing. Indonesia became the convener of the second 
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symposium in 2016. In the symposium, Indonesia mainly 
aimed to increase participants’ comprehension of fisheries 
crime and why it should be categorized as TOC. Susi 
asserted that position in her opening speech of the 
symposium by stating that Indonesia fully supports the 
notion to categorize fisheries crime as TOC and persuading 
UNODC to officially announce the categorization (Detik, 
2016). Besides the International Symposium on Fisheries 
Crime in 2016, Indonesia also hosted Our Ocean 
Conference in 2018.  Indonesia did not waste its 
opportunity to redefine the IUU Fishing problem as TOC. 
In that conference, Indonesia’s Presidential Task Force to 
Combat IUU Fishing (Satgas 115) held a side meeting 
discussing the urgency and strategy to combat TOFC.
    The UN System is the main arena for Indonesia to 
create a regime criminalizing IUU Fishing.  Indonesia 
has tried to seek acknowledgment and resolution from 
UN Bodies to further the process of criminalization. In 
the 25th session of the CCPCJ, Susi Pudjiastuti, who 
acted as Indonesia’s Head of Delegation, raised concern 
on TOFC as one of the emerging transnational organized 
crimes. Susi claimed that TOFC not only threatened 
Indonesia, the largest archipelagic country endowed with 
the several most fertile fishing grounds in the world, but 
also other countries. Susi supported her claim with a set 
of evidence of the conventional transnational organized 
crimes in the fisheries industry. However, as Susi 
expressed her regret, other countries did not see similar 
weight problems as Indonesia had done. At the end of 
her speech, Susi hoped that other countries could join 
the march toward the categorization of TOFC as part of 
the TOC (Asydhad, 2016b). Believing that enough 
backing from other countries was at its disposal, 
Indonesia then used the first UN Ocean Conference in 
2017 to seek a resolution from the UN General 
Assembly in institutionalizing the criminalization of 
IUU Fishing. In the partnership dialogue entitled 
“Making Fisheries Sustainable”, Susi emphasized that the 
UN Members should create an independent team filled 
with experts to recommend the best institution to curb 
TOFC (Sulistiyono, 2017). Far more critical, Susi also 
encouraged the General Assembly to acknowledge such a 
proposal.
   At the regional level, CMMIA has employed a 
different approach to criminalize IUU Fishing. Rather 
than devoting its time to redefine the problem of IUU 
Fishing as TOC, CMMIA pays particular attention to 
create an international legal instrument as the basis to 
criminalize IUU Fishing. While MMAF has utilized the 
existing forums in its criminalization effort, CMMIA has 
attempted to establish a new instrument in dealing with 
IUU Fishing and its related crimes. This effort was 
started when CMMIA held a ‘Regional Conference to 
Establish a Regional Convention Against IUU Fishing 
and Its Related Crimes’ in Bali, 2016. This conference 
was attended by ASEAN member states, Indonesia’s 
neighboring countries in the region such as Australia, 
New Zealand, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, China as 
well as seafood market countries such as Japan, European 
Union, the United States, and South Korea (Rini, 2020). 
International Organizations sharing similar concerns in 
addressing IUU Fishing, such as FAO, UNODC, and 
West Africa SFRC, also attended the conference (Rini, 
2020).
      Considering the forum dynamics, CMMIA’s effort to 
establish the regional convention has witnessed several 
adjustments. Following a suggestion from the 1st 
Technical Expert Meeting of the conference in 2017, 
CMMIA changed the forum’s name to Regional 
Conference on the Establishment of a Regional 
Cooperation Agreement against Crimes Related to 
Fisheries. By the end of 2020, the forum has finished its 
1st Technical Working Group in 2018, which discussed 
the cooperation agreement framework (Interview, 
September 2020b). In fact, CMMIA had scheduled the 
2nd Technical Working Group this year. However, 
because of the pandemic, the event should be canceled. 
CMMIA has been seeking the best time to reschedule the 
event.
   Besides the CMMIA’s initiative to make a legally 
binding regional agreement in addressing crime related 
to fisheries, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
advanced the IUU Fishing criminalization at the regional 
level through its engagement in IORA. Since being 
appointed as the Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi has 
invested so much energy so that Indonesia can take the 
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lead in IORA. Indonesia’s leadership in IORA is one of 
the keys to implement the president’s vision on Global 
Maritime Fulcrum (Weigold, 2015). As the Chair of 
IORA from 2015 to 2017, Indonesia has increased the 
level of the association by organizing the 1st IORA 
summit in 2017.  At the end of the summit, the IORA 
member states issued Jakarta Concord 2017 to promote 
‘regional cooperation for a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous Indian Ocean’ (IORA, 2017).
    Evaluating the progress of Indonesia’s campaign to 
criminalize IUU Fishing through Andreas and 
Nadelmann’s framework on the historical evolution of 
the global prohibition regime, it is safe to say that 
Indonesia has arrived at the third stage of such regime. 
Indonesia and its counterparts—concerning countries 
like Norway and transnational moral entrepreneurs on 
combating IUU Fishing such as PESCAdolus—have been 
able to redefine the TOC problem. Apart from the 
increase in international publication regarding the TOC 
aspect of IUU Fishing in member countries of the UN 
System as the target of Indonesia’s campaign, the 
magnitude of the TOFC problem has been understood 
(Stølsvik, 2019). In addition, Indonesia and other parties 
involved in the International Symposium on Fisheries 
Crime successfully adopted the International Declaration 
on Transnational Organized Crime in the Global Fishing 
Industry or commonly referred to as Copenhagen 
Declaration. As of November 2020, 28 countries have 
signed the non-binding declaration.
      Furthermore, IORA leaders have agreed to strengthen 
the regional cooperation in addressing crimes in the 
fisheries sector, as stated in the Jakarta Concord (IORA, 
2017).  Despite some notable achievements in redefining 
the magnitude of the problem of IUU Fishing by 
exploiting its TOC aspect, Indonesia’s campaign at the 
international level has not been able to institutionalize 
the criminalization of IUU Fishing. In the 1st UN Ocean 
Conference 2017, Indonesia’s delegation failed to get an 
official recognition to criminalize IUU Fishing until the 
end of the conference (Sulistiyanto, 2017). Furthermore, 
as of November 2020, the Regional Conference on the 
Establishment of a Regional Cooperation Agreement 
against Crimes Related to Fisheries has not reached any 
conclusion. In this research interview, some resource 
persons even showed their pessimism about the future of 
the conference on the change in the structural 
opportunity at the global and domestic levels to combat 
IUU Fishing (Interview, September 2020b).
     Insofar, Indonesia has to deal with several obstacles 
in advancing the criminalization of IUU Fishing. First, 
Indonesia’s argumentation to criminalize IUU Fishing 
has been criticized and sometimes rejected. Indonesia’s 
campaign since 2008 has recurrently used the rhetoric to 
categorize IUU Fishing as TOC. Since the very 
beginning, some countries like Spain, China, Vietnam, 
and South Korea have cast their disagreement on that 
idea on the different regimes that regulate IUU Fishing 
and TOC (Rini, 2020). Furthermore, it cannot be denied 
that not all fishing vessels that have committed to IUU 
Fishing also performed forms of TOC at the same time.
    Moreover, unreported and unregulated IUU Fishing 
elements are domestic and can be solved through 
domestic measures (Interview, September 2020a). Rather 
than having a positive impact on the progress of the 
campaign, that legal uncertainty in criminalizing IUU 
Fishing has hindered the process from concluding an 
international prohibition regime, Yuliantiningsih et al. 
(2018) suggested that the government should use the 
term of crimes in the fisheries sector, which has a basis in 
the international legal structure instead of categorizing 
IUU Fishing as TOC to achieve a better result of the 
campaign. Although she has used the term of 
transnational organized fisheries crime in many of her 
remarks, during her term in office, Susi Pudjiastuti, on 
many occasions, expressed her desire to put IUU Fishing 
and TOC at the same basket (Yuliantiningsih et al., 
2018). On the contrary, recognizing this kind of rejection 
in the early phase of its self-initiated conference, CMMIA 
has made a fundamental adjustment by changing the 
conference name.
     The second obstacle that Indonesia has to face is the 
limited strategy in its disposal to advance criminalization. 
According to Andreas & Nadelmann (2006), the driver 
seat of several successful international crime control 
efforts has been filled by the powerful Western countries. 
They argued that the ability of a country like the US to 
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combine its hard and soft power is fundamental in the 
criminalization of particular transnational activities such 
as the war against drugs and money laundering. For both 
scholars, the developing countries can only play second 
fiddle by organizing international crime control 
meetings, adjusting their criminal law to internationally 
agreed concepts, and ratified conventions that do not 
come from its initiative. In this light, Indonesia’s 
initiative to criminalize IUU Fishing is a bold move. As a 
middle power country, Indonesia lacks the capability to 
coerce and co-opt other states to support its international 
crime control agenda. At the same time, Indonesia’s 
effort to criminalize is not in line with the interest of 
China as a great power country.  According to a report 
published by ODI (2020), China has a significant role in 
the global landscape of IUU Fishing. As the country with 
the largest distant water fishing fleets (DWF) worldwide, 
China has a huge involvement in prolonging IUU 
Fishing. The organization has identified that some 
vessels committed to IUU Fishing control the Chinese 
state-owned DWF company. It came as no surprise; then, 
on many occasions, China rejected Indonesia’s initiative 
to criminalize IUU Fishing (Interview, October 2020) 
and showed its tendency to slow the progress of the 
conference (Interview, September 2020b).
     The purpose of this study is to assess the progress of 
Indonesia’s campaign to criminalize IUU Fishing at the 
global level. Employing the historical evolution of the 
global prohibition regime developed by Andreas and 
Nadelmann (2006), this study discovered that Indonesia 
has arrived at the third stage of making the global 
prohibition regime on TOC in the fisheries industry. 
This claim is based on the ability of Indonesia to redefine 
the pressing problem of IUU Fishing as a TOC. 
However, Indonesia has still been struggling to garner 
support for the establishment of an international 
convention that regulates the prohibition of TOC, which 
ubiquitously takes place in many IUU Fishing cases. 
Furthermore, several kinds of state-sponsored IUU 
Fishing in the landscape of the current global fisheries 
industry have become a stumbling block in advancing the 
formulation of such a global prohibition regime.
       This study has added a new dimension to comprehend 
how Joko Widodo’s government has tried to curb IUU 
Fishing. The previous studies have not dealt with 
Indonesia’s effort to criminalize IUU Fishing at the 
regional and global levels in a satisfying manner. Most of 
the studies have focused on the law enforcement measure 
in terms of the sinking-vessel policy. Indeed, some 
researchers have devoted their time to develop a 
connection between IUU Fishing in Indonesia and TOC 
and embarked on analyzing how Indonesia deals with 
IUU Fishing at the regional and international levels. 
However, their analysis frameworks are insufficient to 
comprehend how Indonesia criminalizes TOC in 
fisheries industries at the regional and international 
levels. Andreas and Nadelmann’s approach, which 
combines IR and criminology, has helped this study show 
a detailed analysis of the progress of the criminalization 
campaign significant for Indonesia in addressing one of 
the root causes of IUU Fishing.
     The findings of this study suggest several courses of 
action for Indonesia to push the criminalization 
campaign forward. First, Indonesia has to strengthen its 
argument on how IUU Fishing can be categorized as a 
TOC. It can be done by enhancing support to the 
network of epistemic communities to formulate such an 
argumentation. Second, Indonesia must be able to 
diversify its strategy when dealing with opposing 
countries. If Indonesia can convince the opposing 
countries to support the criminalization, then it will be 
easier to establish the global prohibition regime on TOC 
in fisheries industries.
CONCLUSION
       This article was supported by the research grant from 
the Department of International Relations, Faculty of 
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